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Reviews / Historia Mathematica 35 (2008) 248–253 249problem of the philosophy of mathematics (briefly put and without entering into the philosophical stakes, the possible
existence of a unifying theory in mathematics). One consequence was precisely to show that mathesis universalis had
little to do with the program of a mathematical knowledge of nature, contrary to the dominant idea prevailing at that
time. The same can be said for the “quaestio de certitudine mathematicarum,” the only difference being that some
important authors of this corpus, such as the Jesuit Benito Perera, did in fact use this problem in their comments on
the relationship between mathematics and physics.
These difficulties are clearly found in the book itself. Some authors, like Campanella, do address the quaestio
within a context grounded on a general analysis of the status of mathematics in relation to natural philosophy. By
contiguity, this allows Sergio to find answers to the quaestio in authors, such as Bacon or Boyle, who make no explicit
mention of it. But even if one accepts this hazardous construction, it remains very difficult to understand how the
explicit mathematical treatment of the quaestio by authors such as Barrow or Wallis (briefly mentioned in the long
concluding chapter on Newton) could be connected to this general problem. In fact, the author plays in this case on
the proximity between the development on the quaestio and the theme of a mathesis universalis. But, once again, even
if one accepts this construction, it is quite obvious that authors such as Campanella, Bacon, and Boyle had little to do
with the problem of a “universal Mathematic” (which they do not address). At the same time, important authors of the
history of “universal Mathematic” such as van Schooten, Tschirnhaus, Ehard Weigel, and, of course, his most famous
student, Leibniz, do not enter the picture.
Because of these weaknesses, the book delivers more of a description of a corpus than a clear understanding of what
is at stake in the problems it chooses to address. It remains valuable, however, for its synthetic effort and the access
it gives to texts. On an editorial level, the numerous typos are regrettable, particularly those involving discrepancies
between the references given in the notes and those in the actual bibliography.
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Disciplining Statistics: Demography and Vital Statistics in France and England, 1830–1885
By Libby Schweber. Durham and London (Duke University Press). 2006. ISBN 0-8223-3814-9. US$23.95
There are three kinds of books written over the past 30 years that have examined the history of probability and/or
statistics: (1) books that describe only the technical developments of the subjects; (2) books that provide only the
social, scientific, philosophical or political background to the developments; and (3) books that are a mixture of
the first two types. A classic example of the first type is Anders Hald’s A History of Probability and Statistics and
Their Applications before 1750, an encyclopaedic treatment of the technical development of probability theory, while
an example of the second type is Theodore Porter’s Karl Pearson: The Scientific Life in a Statistical Age, a book
that describes the background society and politics that motivated Karl Pearson’s statistical work without describing
his work in any technical detail. I would put Stephen Stigler’s The History of Statistics: The Measurement of Un-
certainty before 1900 in the third category, as technical developments of the subject and the scientific background
are both given. Libby Schweber’s book clearly falls in the second category. If you are looking for a book that de-
scribes the development of the techniques used in demography and vital statistics over approximately the middle half
of the 19th century, this book is not for you. If, on the other hand, you want a discussion of the motivations and
political background of the work, then the book raises some interesting questions and provides equally interesting
answers.
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of Chapter 4 (p. 93):
As we have seen, nineteenth-century demography consisted of a revival of the more abstract, speculative approach to
statistics formerly associated with political arithmetic. In the first half of the nineteenth century this approach was rein-
troduced in association with problems of public hygiene and social statistics more generally. The leading formulations
in the period can be found in the work of Quetelet, Villermé, and Fourier. Guillard and Bertillon drew on this tradition
in the development of demography [in France]. In England, William Farr combined the same early-nineteenth-century
French tradition with local actuarial techniques to produce vital statistics. But whereas in France demography broke with
the public hygiene movement, in England, vital statistics retained the original association. And whereas in France demog-
raphy was excluded from elite social science and administration, in England it was held up as the ideal form of statistical
practice. Finally, whereas in France social statisticians struggled to apply this new form of statistics to national population
statistics, in England social statisticians were singularly unconcerned by the ontological considerations which so troubled
the French.
The book is devoted to exploring these differences and to explaining them through the differing political backgrounds
of the two countries, through the different organizational structures of their scientific institutions, through the different
reward systems available to the scientists involved, and through the different approaches that each country took to what
constituted scientific knowledge. Dr. Schweber looks at the failure of demography and vital statistics to evolve into
distinct disciplines by the end of the time period she examines and explains the failure within the social, political, and
scientific backgrounds of the two countries.
Dr. Schweber presents an interesting argument that makes good reading and food for thought. However, it is marred
by some errors, confusions, and omissions. Here is one example of an error at a minor level. On p. 20, Dr. Schweber
writes,
Why did it take over eighty years for mathematicians to move from Euler’s ‘invention’ of the method of least squares to
Galton’s and Pearson’s use of the ‘error curve’ to model social and biological phenomena?
The method of least squares was actually due to Legendre in 1805; Euler’s approach to the problem of solving several
linear equations with fewer unknowns than equations was a failure. Coming to the next point, whether it is an error,
major or minor, I cannot tell; it is just confusing to me. There is a puzzling sentence on page 93 just after the quotation
from Chapter 4 given above:
Why did English statisticians adopt a probabilistic interpretation of national population statistics nearly fifty years before
they mastered the techniques of probability theory, and why did French statisticians resist doing so?
Are we talking of John Graunt in the 1660s and hence mastering probability in about 1710 with De Moivre’s De Men-
sura Sortis, or William Farr in the 1830s and mastering probability in the 1880s through Galton’s use of the normal
distribution? It is not clear to me. If it is Farr, who happens to be a major character in the book, then how is this rec-
onciled with the fact that English mathematicians were very familiar with the techniques of probability theory in the
18th century? Further, English probability techniques transferred to whatever “population” statistics were available
through the rise of actuarial science and its penetration into the insurance and annuity industry beginning in the 1760s.
The omission will take a little longer to discuss. The issue revolves around a dispute between social reformer
Edwin Chadwick and actuary Francis Neison that played out in the Journal of the Statistical Society of London. The
dispute was over the use of certain measures of mortality. Chadwick argued in favour of the average age at death for
mortality comparisons between groups and Neison showed that this measure was unreliable in that it varied with the
age structure of the population. In trying to relate this dispute to conceptual differences that arose in discussions over
demography in France, Dr. Schweber states (p. 114),
Chadwick’s argument rested on a distinction between actual observations (which were reliable) and hypothesis and math-
ematical calculations, which were not.
Reviews / Historia Mathematica 35 (2008) 248–253 251To support this statement she quotes from Chadwick’s paper. There Chadwick states (and Dr. Schweber quotes on
p. 114),
Deductions from tables, however correctly made from the experience of other towns, must be, and are proved, by such
experience as that hereafter cited, to be, merely ‘guess-work.’ [Vide ‘General Sanatory Report,’ pp. 218, 219.] For myself,
I make it a general rule of precaution neither to receive nor adduce statistical returns as evidence without previous inquiry,
wherever it is possible, into the particulars on which they are founded, or with which they are connected. I adduce them
less as principal evidence, proving anything by themselves, than as proximate measures, or as indications of the extent of
the operation of causes substantiated by distinct investigations.
What has been omitted is the rest of the paragraph [Chadwick, 1844, 8]:
The general conclusions which the facts that have come to my knowledge tend to establish on the subject of the experience
of mortality are, that there is no general law of mortality yet established that is applicable to all countries or to all classes,
or to all times, as commonly assumed; that every place, and class, and period has rather its own circumstances and its
own law, varying with those circumstances; that the actual experience of any class, or place, or period (even with the
disturbances of any ordinary amount of migration, or immigration, or any ordinary influx of young lives from births) is a
safer guide than any insurance table deduced from the experience of another people living at another time and place, or
any assumed general law.
Here Chadwick is not rejecting mortality laws per se, or hypotheses and mathematical calculations, but rather is
accepting the fact that the laws can change for different populations and subsets of populations. Neison’s objection
to Chadwick’s measure was made on technical grounds; the average age at death depends on the age structure of the
population. In his own analysis in rebuttal to Chadwick, Neison recognized Chadwick’s point in the second half of
the quotation and looked at the mortality experience of several subpopulations. The search for a single acceptable
measure, which took into account the age structure of the population when making mortality comparisons between
groups, continued for at least another 20 years until William Farr came up with the standardized mortality ratio in
1865. Consequently, I question whether Dr. Schweber’s initial claim about Chadwick’s argument is correct.
There was another point about the Chadwick–Neison dispute that disturbed me. Dr. Schweber says of the discussion
that followed Chadwick’s presentation of his paper (p. 113),
Rather than continue the debate at the next meeting, the president asked Neison to prepare a written rejoinder to be
included alongside Chadwick’s paper in the next issue of the Journal of the Statistical Society of London.
This has a footnote that leads to a source given on page 256 as “‘Minutes of the Council.’ Paper read at the Statistical
Society of London, 1843–44.” I was unable to find this source. What I found instead were items under “Proceedings
of the Statistical Society of London” in the 1844 volume of the Journal. The Proceedings merely state that the two
papers were read before the Society and give the dates of the meetings. The only mention of Chadwick and Neison in
the “Tenth Annual Report of the Council of the Statistical Society of London, Session 1843–44” in the same volume
is an acknowledgement of thanks to them and some others for their contributions in view of financial pressures on the
Society that made it unable to fund “original investigations.” Further, Neison’s paper opens with only the words, “The
present contribution has been made in consequence of the discussion which followed the reading of Mr. Chadwick’s
paper, at the last meeting of this Society” [Neison, 1844, 41]. I found no mention anywhere of the president asking
Neison to write a rejoinder.
Despite my lengthy criticisms of a few points, the book is well worth reading for those interested in the development
of statistics in the 19th century. I found the analysis of statistical work as it evolved in France, and the comparison of
the differences between the developments in France and England, particularly insightful.
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Les Théorèmes de Noether. Invariance et lois de conservation au XXe siècle, avec une traduction de l’article
original, “Invariante Variationsprobleme”
By Y. Kosmann-Schwarzbach and L. Meersseman. 2nd, revised edition. Palaiseau (Éditions de l’École
Polytechnique). 2006. ISBN 2-7302-1138-1. No price given
In 1915 and 1916 Emmy Noether was asked by Felix Klein and David Hilbert to assist them in understanding
issues involved in any attempt to formulate a general theory of relativity, in particular the new ideas of Einstein. She
was consulted particularly over the difficult issue of the form a law of conservation of energy could take in the new
theory, and she succeeded brilliantly, finding two deep theorems which state that
1. If an integral is invariant under the action of a group depending on r parameters, then there are r linearly indepen-
dent Lagrangian expressions that are the corresponding divergences, and conversely. This result also holds if the
number r is infinite.
2. If an integral is invariant under the action of a group depending on r arbitrary functions and their derivatives
up to order k, then there are r identities in the Lagrangian expressions and their derivatives up to order k, and
conversely.
This book carries a translation of Noether’s paper [1918] into French, and then describes the strange history of its
reception and the responses to her work. Ultimately the theorems became decisive in a shift from basing fundamen-
tal physics on conservation laws to basing it on symmetries or, if that is too strong, then in thoroughly explaining
the connection between these two families of ideas. But between 1916 and 1950 or thereabouts the theorem was
but poorly understood and Noether’s name disappeared almost entirely. People such as Klein and Einstein did little
more than mention her name in the various popular or historical accounts they wrote, and those who came along
immediately afterward and must have known what was her deep and original contribution in this area did the same:
neither Weyl nor Pauli mentioned it when they should have. The attentive reader of their accounts might have noticed
that she did something, but not something profound and original. Worse, earlier attempts that had been eclipsed by
Noether’s achievements were remembered, and sometimes figure in quick “historical” accounts of the time. Similarly,
the theorems were cut back an the second one was largely forgotten.
In the 1950s the tide reversed, but even then few bothered to consult the original paper and most were content to
rely on inadequate attributions and label new versions of something like the same idea “Noether’s theorem” (in the
singular). Only in the 1970s did real generalizations and deepenings of her theorems start to emerge, and this book
closes with some of them. The book also reproduces some of the correspondence between Noether and Klein.
The book is well researched; the sections devoted to proving a negative (that Noether and her work are barely
mentioned for decades) succeed, as do the accounts of her work in the Göttingen milieu of the day and the final
recovery of her ideas. Yvette Kosmann-Schwarzbach sensibly refused to write a history of physics and the calculus
of variations in the period 1915 to 1970 but kept close to her theme. In historical terms, I believe this was the right
decision, but mathematically the focus may be too tight. If she had decided to discuss the idea of what a conservation
